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Culture-Based Violence Against Immigrant
Women in German Federal Court of Justice
(BGH) Decisions
Erol Rudolf Pohlreich          
In this paper I will show the material problems of judicial assessments of
violence based on foreign culture.1 These are elaborated from a sample of the
Federal Court of Justice’s decisions on homicides and sex-related crimes.
Subsequently, possible alternatives to existing judicial assessments of cul-
ture-based violence by the Federal Court of Justice (BGH) are discussed.
The increasing number of reports on culture-based violence against im-
migrant women in the German media has led to a change in public opinion
within the general debate on integration. Forced marriages, so-called ‘honour
killings’ or female genital cutting now serve as a projection screen for criti-
cism of integration policies to date. The growing attention that people pay to
these forms of violence against women in Germany coincides with a discus-
sion about the introduction of new or modifications to existing criminal pro-
visions,2 in order to reflect the public’s abhorrence of such violent behaviour
in case law. This paper examines the current approach of case law to vio-
lence identified as culture-based in the German case law at the Federal Court
of Justice, demonstrated on sex-related crimes and homicides according to
valid legal provisions.3 There are no extant decisions by the Federal Court of
Justice on the criminality of forced marriages or customary female genital
cutting in Germany. The German case law, on the other hand, has found
ways of considering cultural evidence in the offender’s favour with regard to
                                                          
1 The term ‘culture-based violence’ is viewed critically by the author but used within this arti-
cle referring to the terms of court lanaguage. The exact German term ‘Gewalt mit fremdkul-
turellem Hintergrund’ means in word-by-word translation ‘violence with a foreign cultures
background’ but would be too complicated for the English chapter and was replaced by
‘culture-based violence’.
2 This has for some years concerned mainly the penal repression of forced marriages. For fur-
ther details on currently applicable legal regulations and the reform discussion cf. Kal-
thegener 2007; Schubert/Moebius 2006.
3 A more comprehensive investigation of the punishment of so-called ‘honour killings’ and
other homicides with cultural motivation can be found in Pohlreich 2009.
384 Erol Rudolf Pohlreich
homicides and sex-related crimes, even though the German criminal code
does not expressly admit it as a mitigating circumstance. The decisions under
investigation do not exclusively refer to immigrant women, but they still al-
low for conclusions to be drawn about the criminal justice’s way of dealing
with violence against immigrant women.
Based on these decisions the study shows the circumstances under which
the German criminal justice system at the Federal Court of Justice uses for-
eign cultural motives for offender-friendly determination of punishment and
whether this results in immigrant women being protected differently by the
law than German women. Seeing that the German criminal justice system as-
sesses cultural motives for a crime inconsistently and even stereotypically,
the question arises what alternatives are there when dealing with culturally-
based violence. In the author’s opinion, reference to the offenders’ culture of
origin is generally not necessary for determining an appropriate sentence. In
the interest of legal certainty and a uniform application of the law it is, there-
fore suggested that cultural evidence should be considered when determining
the sentence, but only within the framework of such criteria which may apply
to offenders of any origin. Wherever these criteria do not apply, cultural evi-
dence cannot be taken into consideration.
Sex-related crimes
When considering cultural evidence of sexual offences in the offender’s fa-
vour, the Federal Court of Justice postulates varying requirements. In par-
ticular, the extent to what the offender’s diverging perceptions must be re-
flected in their native culture in order to be considered in their favour re-
mains unclear. Sometimes the offender’s perceptions to be in unison with
their native legal system is required, and sometimes this requirement seems
to be dispensed with. Another decision from the recent past, presented in the
following paragraphs, is even more difficult to place, as here the offender’s
immigrant background was not considered in his favour when determining
the sentence but a decision made to the contrary.
Immigrant background as mitigating circumstance
In general, an offender’s foreign cultural perceptions work in their favour
when it comes to determining the sentence for a sexual offence. The Federal
Court of Justice, however, contests general assumptions of the accused being
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most probably absorbed in sexist images of women in his native country. Ir-
respective of the fact that the German criminal code applies in Germany, for-
eign perceptions can only be regarded as mitigating factors if they are in line
with the other country’s legal system.4 The Federal Court of Justice does not,
however, regularly raise the question of whether an offender’s sexual morals
are in line with the criminal code of their country of origin. In a recent deci-
sion,5 it was apparently sufficient for the Federal Court of Justice to see that
the offender’s sexual morals were in line with the religious values of his
culture of origin. The case dealt with a Kurdish Yazidi, whose family tried to
force her to marry her cousin. He abducted her and repeatedly coerced her
into sexual intercourse. The Federal Court of Justice confirmed the convic-
tion for second degree kidnapping as well as a single count of rape. This was
reasoned on the offender’s and the victim’s cultural background and the
family’s ‘high expectations’. Pointing out that the victim’s cultural back-
ground was Yazidi is peculiar, as this may lead to the inappropriate impres-
sion that Yazidi women must submit to sexual violence more than other
women. Additional concerns are raised as now, apart from the – relatively –
clear touchstone of the legal system of the country of origin, the criterion of
religious background is introduced, which may tempt to make stereotyping
assessments.
A decision from 20016 also did not take the criminal code of the of-
fender’s country of origin into account. The offender had been living in
Germany for 30 years and had been married to his wife from the same origin
since 1975. As a result of marital problems, the wife moved out and filed for
a divorce petition with the Family Court, but, when urged by her sons, re-
turned to the accused. He coerced her into sexual intercourse by threatening
her with a knife. The wife moved out of the flat after frequent altercations
and further incidents of physical violence, and pressed charges for bodily
harm. After the divorce, the situation calmed down, which is why the woman
repeatedly asked for a lenient sentence during the trial. The Federal Court of
Justice assumed a less severe case, the assertion of which is generally possi-
ble if individual facts of the case deviate significantly from the regular case
and therefore call for less severe punishment.7 Such conditions were, in the
assessment of the judges, the long years of marriage with the victim, his de-
sire for her affection as well as the assumption that he was less inhibited than
a German offender. Also the common origins of the spouses and their being
                                                          
4 BGH NStZ-RR 1999, 359; 1998, 298f.
5 BGH decision dated 1st February 2007 – 4 StR 514/06, unpublished to date.
6 BGH StV 2002, 20f.
7 BGH StV 2002, 20f. with further references.
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deeply rooted in common values, which supposedly demand submission and
obedience of the wife, were considered in his favour.
In fact, it was a case of rape involving the use of a dangerous instrument,
which § 177 par. 4 of the German Criminal Code penalises with a minimum
prison term of five years. If, however, an unspecified less severe case, as de-
fined by § 177 par. 5, applies, the term is one to ten years in prison. The Fed-
eral Court of Justice elaborated that in the case of concurrence of aggravated
rape, as defined by § 177 par. 4 of the German Criminal Code (StGB) and a
less severe count, the minimum term must not remain below the statutory
minimum for rape, i.e., two years.
Foreign cultural background as aggravating circumstance
Interestingly enough, in the Federal Court of Justice considerations, the vic-
tim’s origins and their cultural background sometimes are disadvantageous
for the offender. Aggravating circumstances are, for instance, if a devout
Turkish Muslim returns to her parents’ home after multiple rapes, is no
longer respected by her cultural community as a divorcee and is burdened by
the reduced chances of entering into a suitable marriage.8 As the woman and
the perpetrator have the same cultural background, it could have been as-
sumed that, as in the case of the Yazidi Kurd, the cultural aspect would have
been considered a mitigating factor. There is no information to the effect that
the Yazidi culture is particularly sensitive or open about experiences of rape.
The Yazidi Kurd woman, however, intended to calm the situation and ‘ex-
tend a hand’ to the accused by having her attorney declare that she would
agree to a suspended sentence. It was the good fortune of the accused that
she had, in the meantime, married her secret boyfriend and apparently did not
have especially close ties with the Yazidi culture, thanks to which he re-
ceived his mild sentence. Otherwise it could have been quite possible for the
sentence to shift to the other extreme.
The question is, should the respective cultural background (be it a con-
structed or an actual one) be considered in the assessment of the severity of
the punishment at all? The severe consequences for the repeatedly raped wife
described in the latter decision should be clear to those without intimate
knowledge of her culture as well, and should justify a comparably severe
punishment, even when considered individually. As far as the cases de-
scribed earlier are concerned, a more lenient punishment seems possible even
without taking cultural evidence into account. This is why these decisions, by
                                                          
8 BGH ruling dated 20/06/2007 – 1 StR 167/07.
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emphasising cultural aspects, are conducive to a far too stereotypical percep-
tion of non-Western cultures.
Crimes against life
If the Federal Court of Justice’s decisions on sex-related crimes with a for-
eign background appear inconsistent, this applies even more so to how the
Federal Court of Justice deals with homicides committed by offenders with a
non-German cultural background. Here case law in its sometimes contradic-
tory and often confused causistry in individual cases refrains from the pre-
sumption of base motives for a crime and convicts the offenders of man-
slaughter (prison terms up to 15 years) instead of murder (life imprisonment),
if no other criteria for murder apply.
According to case law, a motive is base, if ‘according to general moral
values it is at the lowest moral level, determined by uncontrollable, driven
selfishness and therefore particularly condemnable, even contemptible.9 In
the case of killings motivated by so-called foreign cultures, the question
arises: according to what set of moral values should the motives be judged?
It is imaginable to focus solely on the foreign morals. Current case law, how-
ever, asks objectively, whether the motive was base, i.e. without considering
the perpetrator’s origins or socially determining factors. The yardstick for as-
sessing a motive is, moreover, to be derived from the values of the general
legal community in the Federal Republic of Germany and not from the per-
ceptions of ethnic communities that do not accept this legal community’s
moral and legal values.10 This in no way anticipates a negative result for the
perpetrator, as long as perceptions, which initially appear foreign, are ques-
tioned critically to the effect of whether they indeed diametrically oppose the
values in this country or whether they are universally comprehensible.11
When it comes to culture-based killings, case law for once does not pre-
sume base motives, if the perpetrator at the time of the crime was not aware
of the fact that these could be weighted as aggravating, or if he was not able
to exercise will-power to control the passions determining his physical acts.
This implies that a perpetrator allegedly determined to a large degree by his
cultural perceptions, who due to his personality or living situation, was not
able to disengage himself from them at the time of the offence, as an excep-
                                                          
9 BGHSt 3, 132f.; 42, 226; 47, 128.
10 BGH NStZ 2006, 284; 2002, 369; 1995, 79; BGHR StGB § 211 II base motives 41; BGH
NJW 2004, 1466ff.; BGH NStZ-RR 2004, 361f.
11 Cf. BGH NStZ 2006, 286.
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tion to the rule can be convicted of manslaughter in spite of the objective
baseness of his motives.12 The same applies to the perpetrator still very much
attached to his culture of origin, who cannot comprehend the meaning of
baseness of the motive.13
Implications of cultural pressure
In the Federal Court of Justice’s first decision on the authority of the coun-
try’s values,14 the rejection of base motives was accounted for by the fact that
the Eastern Anatolian accused acted on pressure exerted by his family. The
length of his stay in Germany is not revealed, and neither is the sort of pres-
sure exerted on him. Apart from his simple character, the Federal Court of
Justice found it sufficient that the accused was ´caught up in the idea of
‘vendetta’ and ‘chosen’ by his family for carrying out the deed´. This alleg-
edly reduced his freedom of choice at the time of the offence.
A more recent decision by the Federal Court of Justice15 on the other
hand, did not allow any kind of pressure on the perpetrator to be seen as a
mitigating factor. This case dealt with the killing of a member of the Kurdish
Workers’ Party, PKK, and his mistress by three other members of the party
on the orders of the regional leader, as he deemed this relationship to be dis-
honourable. The Federal Court of Justice affirmed the assumption of base
motives in its decision. Pressure would only be considered a mitigating factor
for the perpetrator if they were threatened with physical violence or death. It
was apparently of no importance for the Federal Court of Justice in this case
that two of the accused had already been severely beaten up in Turkey for not
adhering to PKK orders – the possibility of torture cannot be ruled out – and
the third accused suffered from extreme fear of physical violence after an
imprisonment in Turkey.16 It might be conclusive not to consider these kinds
of pressures nor the social consequences; but to be consistent, then, neither
family exerted pressure nor an imminent social isolation must be counted as
mitigating factors for the perpetrator per se, but only qualified pressure.17
                                                          
12 BGH NStZ 1995, 79 with further references
13 BGH NJW 2006, 1008 (1012).
14 BGH NStZ 1995, 79.
15 BGH StV 2003, 21.
16 Cf. Momsen 2003: 238.
17 Partially different in Valerius 2008: 916, who questions the particular reprehensibility of the
motives for the killing, if the loss of respect and honour in the perpetrator’s social environ-
ment leads to social ostracism.
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Implications of the perpetrator’s social integration
Case law only intends to consider different moral values in a perpetrator’s
favour, if his fixation on values narrows his mind. As such, a fixation on val-
ues regularly decreases with the progress of integration it should only be
taken into account in exceptional cases. Consequently, the consideration of
base motives requires a comprehensive evaluation of the individual process
of integration. Supposedly ‘informative cues’ in this question are a long stay
in the host country, a working life, circles of friends and acquaintances,
commitment to societies and political organisations, language difficulties as
well as preferences in food and drink.18 For the Federal Court of Justice, the
duration of stay does not directly translate into how well the perpetrator is
integrated. But if the Federal Court of Justice does not pay attention to the
time of stay, this begs the question why it emphasises it at all and with con-
tradicting results.
In the PKK case, the Federal Court of Justice contested that the judge-
ment of two of the accused was still affected after their fourteen-year stay in
Germany, as they had already been convicted as joint offenders in a case of
attempted vendetta killing in this country. It did, however, also affirm that
the third accused was capable of rational judgement, notwithstanding the fact
that he had only been in Germany for two years, as he had felt connected to
‘the ‘people’s’ cause’ but did not want to commit any further to the society
or the PKK. As evidenced in a later decision, on the other hand, even after a
ten-year stay in Germany and naturalisation, the assertion of rational judge-
ment was not a given.19 In another decision, the accused pleaded his attach-
ment to his culture of origin after a twenty-year stay in Germany and natu-
ralisation, which was refuted as counterfactual.20 In a decision dating from
197721, the Federal Court of Justice elaborated that during the period of cul-
tural adaptation a foreigner’s judgement may be affected, as they may relapse
into a ‘Sicilian way of thinking’ when committing a crime and not be able to
fully comprehend the disproportion between the killing and its occasion. Ap-
parently, the Federal Court of Justice assumes that immigrants increasingly
adapt throughout their stay in this country. It is not taken into consideration
that immigrants do not, as a rule, entirely assimilate and shake off their en-
culturation. Also the reference in one 200322 decision by the Federal Court of
Justice to an ´accused incapable of integration´ says a great deal about the
                                                          
18 Schneider 2003: Paragraph 95; cf. also Fischer 2008: § 211 Paragraph 29.
19 BGH sentence dated 5th September 2007, 2 StR 306/07, unpublished to date.
20 BGH NStZ-RR 2007, 86.
21 BGH in Holtz 1977: 809.
22 BGH NStZ-RR 2004, 44 (commented by Trück 2004: 497).
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judges’ understanding of integration. Apparently there are not only those
perpetrators who are unwilling to integrate, but those that are incapable of
integration, so that in some cases, the rational judgement of perpetrators with
foreign enculturation may still be affected after decades of living in Ger-
many.
A more convincing decision stems from the year 200423 which dealt with
a man originally from Turkey who had killed his wife, a German citizen who
was born and raised in Germany, by stabbing her 48 times with a knife. She
wanted to separate after being humiliated and abused by him and was not
willing to support him in extending his residence permit. The Federal Court
of Justice contested that his judgement was affected, seeing that members of
the family had informed him about the relationship between men and women
in German society; also the sister had threatened to call the police on him.
Furthermore, it was to be doubted that the accused could have felt justified
by his Anatolian values to continuously abuse and eventually kill his wife.
Rather, turning up the volume on the radio before the act so as to make sure
the neighbours could not hear what was going on, as well as denying the
charges towards his parents, might indicate that he very well understood the
German assessment of his motives. The Federal Court of Justice also af-
firmed his ability to control his passions, notwithstanding some indications
that the crime was committed on impulse, as a perpetrator’s growing passion
cannot exonerate him if he, as in this case, consciously lets his controllable
emotions drive him to completion of the act.
Implications of the law in the perpetrator’s country of origin
Recently, the Federal Court of Justice has been referring to the law valid in
the perpetrator’s country of origin as an indicator for foreign perpetrators’
subjective attitudes to their motive for killing. In a decision dating from
200424, the Federal Court of Justice affirmed the perpetrator’s capacity for
rational judgement, i.e. by referring to the perpetrator’s country of origin and
its laws. Motives not reflected in their native country’s laws are pure sectar-
ian convictions and therefore not to be considered when assessing the perpe-
trator’s capability of judgement. In the case of the attempted killing of a for-
mer wife, who wanted to separate from her husband, the Federal Court of
Justice emphasised that foreign behavioural patterns, convictions and notions
were, as a rule, to be considered only, if they are in accordance with the for-
                                                          
23 BGH NStZ 2004, 332.
24 BGH NStZ-RR 2004, 361.
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eign legal system, something that did not apply in the case of the Turkish
perpetrator.25
The Federal Court of Justice does not intend to give a conclusive evalua-
tion of the subjective part by referring to the law in the country of origin. It,
therefore, proceeds along the lines of its regular decisions on the range of
punishment, which at times do refer to the law in the country of origin, but at
other times do not.26
Preferably, considerations of the law applicable in the perpetrator’s
country of origin should be excluded altogether. More often than not, the law
in the perpetrator’s country of origin is not as unequivocal as to do away with
any doubts about the perpetrator’s original culture’s leniency towards the
crime committed by him. Moreover, a great number of states are made up not
by a – relatively – homogeneous population, as it is the case in Germany.
Particularly in multinational states like, for instance, Turkey, the Turkish
criminal code cannot be expected to reflect all ethnic communities’ values.
This issue is even more complicated where states like Nigeria are concerned,
where the applicable criminal code varies according to place of residence,
ethnicity and religion.
Alternative solutions for the punishment of culture-
based homicides
If the Federal Court of Justice’s consideration of the assumed effects of for-
eign cultures in the case of sex-related crimes is questionable, it is even more
so in the case of homicides, such as the so-called ‘honour killings’. For cul-
pable homicides, constitutional issues arise out of the mandatory lifelong
prison sentence, as demanded for murder in § 211 StGB, because according
to the Federal Constitutional Court’s case law the sentence must be propor-
tional to the severity of the crime and must not exceed the perpetrator’s cul-
pability.27 On the other hand, the mandatory link between elements of murder
and life imprisonment serves legal certainty and a uniform application of the
law.28
                                                          
25 BGH NStZ-RR 2007, 86.
26 For the foreign legal code’s authority cf. BGH in Pfister 1999: 359; BGH NStZ-RR 1998,
298. For a merely indicative effect of the foreign legal code cf. BGH NStZ 1996, 80; BGH
NStZ-RR 2007, 86 (87).
27 BVerfGE 45, 187 (259 f.) with further references.
28 BVerfGE 45, 187 (260).
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The Federal Constitutional Court infers from art. 103 par. 2 of the Basic
Law (GG), the German constitution, that criminal provisions defining the
more severely penalised crimes must be worded with the greatest precision.29
Certain unspecified elements, however, are admissible as constitutional, pro-
vided a uniform case law accounted for the content.30 Such a provision for
base motives has yet to be worded. In case law the content of such murder
criteria, however, has only been determined insufficiently by a casuistic as
yet. The published decisions by the Federal Court of Justice on taking for-
eign cultural determination into consideration when evaluating subjective re-
quirements for whether base motives apply show significant inconsistencies,
resulting in understandable confusion for the judiciary. In fact, the assess-
ment of whether base motives apply in cases of culpable homicides is re-
versed in 71% of the cases between indictment and conviction of the perpe-
trators.31 For no other element of murder do the assessments vary as signifi-
cantly between judges and courts of appeal as they do for the element of base
motives.32 It is, therefore, hardly to imagine how members of the public are
supposed to make informed decisions, when judges themselves are often at a
loss when faced with this question.
Criminal law responses to an offence dependent on cultural evidence
must, when consistently applying this, lead to a discussion of circumstances,
which often cannot be safely proved. Some of the questions arising from the
consideration of foreign cultural influences are: whether certain views actu-
ally played a significant role in the perpetrator’s socialisation; whether these
views are only held by sectarians in the culture of origin; how the culture of
origin is to be defined and to be limited; whether the crime is based on indi-
vidual or psychological reasons and less on reasons determined by culture or
socialisation;33 whether the criminal behaviour was induced by compulsion;
whether the perpetrator was already integrated and from what moment an
immigrant can be considered sufficiently integrated; and whether the view re-
flected in the crime is in fact diametrically opposed to German views.
Another question is the difference between a perpetrator influenced by
foreign culture – when culture is defined on the basis of similarities amongst
all those who belong to it – and a person influenced by a subculture. In other
words, why is the question of whether deviating views should be considered
not posed for subcultures or members of a sect? It is certainly a misconcep-
tion to believe that all Germans were brought up according to the same moral
                                                          
29 BVerfGE 75, 329 (342f.).
30 BVerfGE 28, 175 (183); 37, 201 (208); 45, 363 (372); 73, 206 (243).
31 Kargl 2001: 368.
32 Eser 1981: 384.
33 On these issues cf. the paper by Gloor/Meier in this Reader.
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code and that subculturally motivated perpetrators willingly cede this uni-
form socialisation and turn towards their subculture. For those who are part
of a subculture, this belonging can be fateful as well, for instance, German
perpetrators, who grow up in parts of Germany that are particularly infamous
for their xenophobia or in such a family, who then go on to kill a foreigner
out of racial hatred. Even if such a German perpetrator was socialised in an
ordinary environment, they could have become involved with a subcultural
community that had such a strong hold on them that the question of consid-
ering these ties when examining their capability of mastering their passions
and controlling themselves should also arise here. This applies also to fanati-
cised members of a sect. If such consideration is demanded for perpetrators
from different cultural backgrounds, then the exclusion of other (German)
perpetrators whose ability to exercise will power or to control themselves
must also be carfully considered, is not entirely convincing.
Limiting the consideration of cultural values to foreign cultures is not
convincing, either, when examining the Federal Court of Justice’s decision
dating from the year 1956, in which it presumed base motives in the case of a
grandmother and grandfather, who in an exaggerated sense of honour killed
their grandchild soon after birth, because it was born out of wedlock.34 It is
easily imaginable that the grandparents at the time were not able to control
their feelings, given that they lived in the country, found out about their un-
married daughter’s pregnancy only when she entered labour and carried out
the crime straight after finding out. As is well known, an illegitimate child
born in 1950s rural Germany could mean social ostracism and complete iso-
lation. The unexpected confrontation with this circumstance they regarded as
shameful may have overwhelmed the couple and led them to commit the
crime. Nevertheless, the Federal Court of Justice at the time did not even
question their ability to control their passions. Moreover, reading between
the lines it becomes clear that it, quite rightly, did not at all see a need to dis-
cuss the grandparents’ ability to act in a controlled and rational manner. With
regard to foreign perpetrators, on the other hand, the Federal Court of Justice
– with the exception of premeditated murder – does feel the need to discuss
whether the perpetrators were able to control themselves at the time of the of-
fence in view of their socialisation and the ties following on from it. The
Federal Court of Justice, therefore, applies double standards in considering
the socialisation of German and foreign perpetrators, as it demands a higher
measure of control of German perpetrators than of foreign offenders. Using
the ‘cultural impulse’ to explain offences committed by perpetrators with a
foreign cultural background in effect works in their favour, it reproduces and
                                                          
34 BGHSt 9, 180; crit. Dreher 1956: 501.
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perpetuates un-reflected, stereotypical perceptions of the non-Western ‘For-
eigner’.
Limitations of questioning the ability to exercise
rational judgement
The question of the rational judgement of perpetrators with a foreign cultural
background should only arise if their motive for killing is privileged in the
case law of their country of origin. It is, furthermore, to be assumed that all
cultures in principle disapprove of the premeditated killing of a person. A
specific provision for reduced punishment in the criminal code of the perpe-
trator’s country of origin, as Turkey’s former criminal code provided in its
article 462 up until 2003, for some ‘honour killings’, does not in itself point
to a lack of ability of rational judgement, as a reduced sentence does not ex-
onerate the perpetrator from the crime they are charged with. Irrespective of
the provision in article 462 of Turkey’s former criminal code, the ‘honour
killings’ covered by it were still punished.
In any case, it can be expected that immigrants seeking permanent resi-
dence in Germany should inform themselves of the core provisions of the
criminal code on entering this legal community. Even if they fail to do so and
remain ignorant of the law, they can not be cleared of their responsibility in
spite of their foreign cultural backgrounds.35 It is not the perpetrator’s con-
duct they are charged with but the crime itself. Indeed, reproaching the per-
petrator for their conduct would not be permissible,36 as a perpetrator’s guilt
must always refer to an individual crime. It is, for instance, not permissible to
reproach perpetrators for something that happened through no fault of their
own. Case law, however, does in certain cases link into wrongdoing before
the actual crime was committed,37 provided that perpetrators knowingly did
not inform themselves of certain specific legal regulations, which they could
not then learn at the time of the offence. This applies, for instance, to some-
                                                          
35 Cf. Lesch 1996: 609.
36 According to the national socialist concept of criminal conduct, the determination of pun-
ishment could directly refer back to the perpetrator’s lifestyle before the crime. The guilt
concept has luckily been replaced by the concept of responsibility for a crime. According to
this concept, the punishment depends primarily on the question to what extent the individual
perpetrator is to be blamed for the concrete crime. The perpetrator’s conduct must only be
considered as an exception, and only if it is directly connected with the crime, cf. e.g.
BGHSt 5, 132; BGH NStZ-RR 2001, 295.
37 BGHSt 2, 208 f.; critically on this decision, which deals not really with the avoidability but
an actual error concerning the prohibited nature of an act, Roxin 2006: 949.
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body with an occupation regulated by certain penal provisions or public or-
der offences acts, of which they knowingly fail to get information. The ar-
gument in case law here is that it does not refer to all of the perpetrator’s
conduct in life, but to concrete violations of the duty of care. For it is still the
actual crime the perpetrator is charged with, as long as the charge is founded
on a clearly specified violation of the duty of care before the committal of the
crime (e.g. lack of information about job-related penal provisions), which
from the outset suggested a later violation of the regulation (e.g. a violation
of job-related penal provisions).38
Also it cannot be assumed that immigrants just ended up somewhere
through no fault of their own, as specified in the concept of ‘criminal con-
duct’, if they knowingly and of their own volition determined to immigrate
into a country like Germany. Somebody from a society bindingly applying
tribal customary law or Islamic law to the individual members of that society
cannot presume that the notions behind it coincide entirely with those in
Western industrialised societies. At the least they can be expected to take
note of the limited number of provisions of the core criminal code as from
the time of entering the country it can be surmised that certain behaviour,
more or less approved of or tolerated in the perpetrator’s country of origin,
will be disapproved of or even penalised in the host country. It goes without
saying that immigrants must not ignore the opinions held in the host country,
especially as they are not even required to share these convictions. Whoever
assumes that perpetrators with a supposed foreign cultural background have
an awareness of wrongdoing determined by fate in effect denies them any
learning ability, which after all is an important aspect of a person’s individual
qualities and therefore their dignity.
Considering impaired mental responsibility
The assessment that an impaired mental responsibility reduces the wrong
committed by the perpetrator, makes sense. Raising the fact that a perpetrator
is from a different country to determine, whether they were able to exercise
control results in an untenable, stereotyped image of non-German nationals.
The Federal Court of Justice no longer considers cultural evidence in the
same way as in its first pertinent decision39, when it claimed that personality
defects would have to be pleaded for ‘psychopathic personalities’ and conse-
                                                          
38 Roxin 2006: 949f.; Rudolphi 2008: Paragraph 44f. with further references.; Puppe 2004: 238
with further references.
39 BGH GA 1967,  244.
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quently all the more for foreigners, if they are deeply rooted in the divergent
values of their countries of origin. On the other hand, the question of im-
paired mental responsibility only marginally applies to perpetrators with a
foreign cultural background, if we take a closer look at Paeffgen’s example
of substantiating this requirement: ‘Same as a shackled person cannot be re-
proached for remaining inactive, someone wrapped up in their motivation
cannot, in excess, be reproached for their inability to master their motives.’40
A person with an immigrant background is as rational an individual as
anyone else and not so deeply wrapped up in their motivation so as not to be
able to control themselves. Whoever wishes to consider diminished responsi-
bility or lack of self-control based on cultural backgrounds in the perpetra-
tor‘s favour, must at the same time take note of standards tolerating violence
within the German culture and regard them in the German perpetrator’s fa-
vour. Quite rightly, though, the Federal court of Justices show no signs of
doing so.41 Here the constitutional requirement of the punishment’s propor-
tion to the crime is overemphasised for immigrants and – for very good rea-
sons, nonetheless – subordinated for those perpetrators motivated by German
culture. Besides, the consideration of foreign cultural ties depends on a tan-
gle of factors not provable, thus favouring unpredictable court decisions.
With regard to the predictability and uniformity of state penalisation this ap-
proach thus appears to be highly questionable.
It would, therefore, make sense to weigh the impaired mental responsi-
bility of perpetrators with a foreign cultural background to the same extent as
that of perpetrators socialised in Germany to presume diminished responsi-
bility only for those reasons that potentially apply to anyone, e.g. overfatigue,
paraphilias or spontaneous reactions to sudden uncontrollable passions42.
Thus, the original cultural background of the perpetrator should not in itself
become a reason for questioning their ability to exercise control over their
passions.
Conclusion
When punishing violent crimes against immigrant women, the victim’s in-
grained cultural values carry any weight only in exceptional cases in the Fed-
                                                          
40 Paeffgen 1982: 271.
41 Cf. BGHSt 9, 180.
42 BGH NJW 1989, 1739 (1740) with further references; NStZ-RR 1998, 67f.; NStZ-RR 2004,
108; BGHR StGB § 211 II base motives 10; Eser (2006): Paragraph 39; Schneider (2003):
Paragraph 98.
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eral Court judges’ decisions. The question of whether or not to consider cul-
tural evidence usually arises from the perpetrator’s position and not their
victim’s. It is, however, highly problematic to consider foreign cultural ele-
ments without questioning whether these elements should also be taken into
account for perpetrators without a foreign cultural background. Not explicitly
considering cultural evidence to determinate the sentence would allow for a
more consistent punishment of perpetrators with foreign cultural back-
grounds, something that is not currently done.
Refraining from directly connecting cultural evidence with mitigating
factors does not constitute a violation of art. 103 par. 2 GG setting out the
constitutional right to a fair hearing. The judge’s knowledge of the particu-
larities of the other culture can and should help them qualify the evidentiary
facts and the perpetrator’s personality in line with criteria for determination
of punishment that apply to all perpetrators of any origin or culture. Where,
however, cultural evidence cannot be assigned to any generally acknowl-
edged criterion of determining punishment, it goes beyond the limits of what
can be taken into consideration.
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